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The possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation is a serious concern in the energy industry. Spent uranium fuel contains fissile plutonium that can be separated chemically, making it a pathway for nuclear weapons development. Numerous high-profile cases in recent years have shown that current technology and policies have failed to prevent or deter the development of nuclear capabilities in states that previously did not have them.
The DBI Thorium Reactor program greatly minimizes—if not eliminates— the threat of nuclear weapons proliferation
- After the first generation DBI Thorium Reactor is started, isotope enrichment will not be needed because the 233U bred in each reactor will keep the cycle going.
- No plutonium is created in a thorium breeder reactor.
- The equilibrium between 233U breeding and 233U fission will be reached in the range of 3-4%, so the quantity of fissile material in any single fuel assembly will be far too small to be useful for weapons.
- The much higher burn-up rates will eliminate the need for reprocessing and greatly reduce waste volume.
- The 233U breeding process will also produce quantities of non-fissile isotopes 232U and 234U that would make successful bomb assembly extremely difficult or impossible.
- A small fraction of inexpensive, non-fissile 238U can be added to the thorium to degrade the bred 233U into an isotope mixture not usable for bombs; this option is not available for plutonium because non-fissile plutonium does not exist in nature.
- Because the DBI Thorium Reactor is fueled only once, nuclear material will not be transported into or out of the facility during the life of the reactor—simplifying inventory control and international monitoring, and reducing theft opportunity.
- The small volume of fuel waste will be vitrified in situ and entombed on site when a DBI Thorium Reactor core is decommissioned, eliminating the risks of transporting fissile material to a federal repository.
- The hard gamma ray emissions from 232U decay products will be easily detected by modern security sensors at airports, ports, and other points of entry.
- DBI’s satellite communications link can also assist in monitoring the reactor status and nuclear inventory for non-proliferation assurance.
Proliferation Risks in Conventional Nuclear Reactors
Most reactors require enriched uranium to operate, and isotope enrichment technology can be misused to created highly enriched uranium for weapons.
Uranium-fueled reactors always produce fissile plutonium, which can be separated using simple chemical processes developed during WWII to make nuclear weapons.
Reprocessing conventional nuclear waste to use the unspent fuel creates a stockpile of separated plutonium under civilian industrial control—and thus a tempting theft target.
Fissile plutonium can be hand-carried with minimum shielding and may easily escape detection.
Conventional reactors are typically refueled every 6-18 months, requiring the periodic transportation of nuclear fuel and waste containing fissile material.
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